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1 Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen,AK Groningen, The Netherlands, 2 Department of




In this study, we focus on the possible roles of second-order syntactic recursion and working
memory in terms of simple and complex span tasks in the development of second-order
false belief reasoning. We tested 89 Turkish children in two age groups, one younger (4;6–
6;5 years) and one older (6;7–8;10 years). Although second-order syntactic recursion is sig-
nificantly correlated with the second-order false belief task, results of ordinal logistic regres-
sions revealed that the main predictor of second-order false belief reasoning is complex
working memory span. Unlike simple working memory and second-order syntactic recursion
tasks, the complex working memory task required processing information serially with addi-
tional reasoning demands that require complex working memory strategies. Based on our
results, we propose that children’s second-order theory of mind develops when they have
efficient reasoning rules to process embedded beliefs serially, thus overcoming a possible
serial processing bottleneck.
Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to understand that people have mental states, such as
desires, beliefs, knowledge and intentions, and to realize that mental states of others might be
different from one’s own [1]. Zero-order ToM reasoning concerns our real-life environment.
For instance, if David thinks: “There is a newspaper on the table”, he is applying zero-order
reasoning. However, in daily life we are not just thinking about world facts. For example,
David might think: “Jessica knows that there is a newspaper on the table”. In this situation
David engages in first-order ToM by making a first-order knowledge attribution to Jessica. In
addition to first-order ToM, there are higher orders of ToM, such as David thinking, “Jack
believes that Jessica knows that there is a newspaper on the table”. This time, David is applying
second-order recursion in the thought domain by attributing a first-order mental state to Jack.
First-order theory of mind has been found to be required for a number of simple social
skills and competences. For example, children only start to be able to choose between informa-
tive ploys and deceptive ploys (such as removing tracks or adding false tracks) while hiding a
toy when they are around the age of 4; their appropriate choices then correspond to first-order
mental state attributions such as “now she will not know where the toy really is, but she will
think it is under the cup where the tracks go” [2].







Citation: Arslan B, Hohenberger A, Verbrugge R
(2017) Syntactic Recursion Facilitates and Working
Memory Predicts Recursive Theory of Mind. PLoS
ONE 12(1): e0169510. doi:10.1371/journal.
pone.0169510
Editor: Emmanuel Manalo, Kyoto University,
JAPAN
Received: January 27, 2016
Accepted: December 18, 2016
Published: January 10, 2017
Copyright: © 2017 Arslan et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All data files are
available from the URL: https://figshare.com/s/
16f29e491a95400c8e3a.
Funding: The contributions of BA and RV were
financed by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research for Vici grant NWO-277-80-01,
awarded to RV.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
At the next step of development, second-order theory of mind has been found to be
required for more advanced aspects of children’s everyday social competence, such as idiom
understanding [3], which corresponds to second-order attributions like a hearer’s reasoning
“Peter is not really skating on thin ice, so the speaker wants me to think of a different mean-
ing”. As another concrete example, to successfully maintain a strategic lie, a lying child has to
reason about what the listener knows about what the liar knows, requiring second-order theory
of mind [4]. Similarly, second-order theory of mind is a prerequisite for more complex moral
judgments such as “the father knows that his daughter thinks that he will go to the pool, so he
should really go there” [5]. Finally, second-order theory of mind has been shown to be
required for irony understanding (“although Oliver says ‘You sure are a great scorer’, Oliver
doesn’t really want Robert to believe that he is a great scorer”) [6].
Dennett [7] argued that to have a theory of mind, a person has to be able to correctly attri-
bute a false belief to someone else. Since then, verbal false belief tasks have become one of the
most commonly applied tasks for testing theory of mind [8]. The goal of the first-order false
belief task is to examine whether children can attribute a false belief to another person in a
given story where the child knows the reality while the other person has a false belief about it.
Similarly, the second-order false belief task examines whether children can correctly attribute
to a person a false belief that that person has about another person’s belief. While first-order
false belief understanding develops around the age of four [9], second-order false belief under-
standing develops between the ages of five and seven [10,11]. The goal of this study is to inves-
tigate four- to- eight-year-old children’s development of second-order false belief reasoning.
One striking and much debated finding is that there is a delay between first- and second-
order false belief reasoning in middle childhood. Why do children need some more years to
pass second-order false belief tasks once they are able to pass first-order false belief tasks? The
answer to this question is not entirely clear yet. Following the first-order ToM literature, two
possible explanations have been proposed (see e.g., [12], p. 751). The first explanation is related
to a conceptual change: Children need to realize that mental states such as beliefs can have
other beliefs and not just events in the world as their content (e.g., “John thinks that David
believes that. . .”). The second explanation is related to the complexity of second-order ToM
stories, in terms of the number of beliefs and their recursive organization. According to this
explanation, it is the higher complexity of second-order ToM reasoning that adds further
demands on working memory, as does the linguistic complexity of the stories and the ques-
tions, in comparison to first-order ToM tasks. Although we surmise that there might be a con-
ceptual change of understanding that beliefs can have other beliefs as their content, in the
current study we focus on the complexity explanation and aim to tease apart its components,
namely executive functions and language.
For this purpose, for the first time in the literature, we focused on the role of working mem-
ory, together with the role of recursion in the language and thought domain on the same com-
plexity and the same level of recursion, namely second-order.
In the following subsections of this Introduction, ‘Working Memory and Theory of Mind’
and ‘Syntactic Recursion and Theory of Mind’, we present relevant previous studies and pro-
vide theoretical explanations for the relations between working memory, language and sec-
ond-order ToM.
Working Memory and Theory of Mind
A number of other studies have shown that the development of executive function, more specif-
ically working memory, influences the development of first-order ToM (e.g., [13–15]; but see
also [16] for evidence that simple working memory is not sufficient without inhibition). On the
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other hand, to the best to our knowledge and according to Miller’s [12,17] extensive review,
there are only two studies that focused on the role of working memory and second-order false
belief reasoning in typically developing children and those studies yielded contradictory results.
The first one is Perner et al.’s [18] study with typically developing children and children at
risk of ADHD. As a part of their study, to test executive function, they used forward and back-
ward digit span. They found a significant positive relationship between the simple working
memory task, i.e., the forward digit span, and the second-order false belief task. However,
more recently, Hasselhorn, Mahler, and Grube [19] also tested children around the age of six
with a second-order false belief task and with a simple working memory task (a digit span
task) and a non-word repetition task together with verbal ability tasks. Their results showed
that the significant correlation between the simple working memory span score and children’s
second-order false belief score was no longer reliable when vocabulary knowledge and age
were controlled for (r(56) = .13, ns).
What could be the role of working memory in the development of second-order false belief
reasoning? It has been shown that working memory acts as a bottleneck [20], meaning that
people can only hold one chunk of information in working memory at a time. Given this
restriction, we invoke the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis [21].
Evidence for a working memory bottleneck in ToM reasoning comes from dual-task para-
digms. The general idea of the dual-task paradigm is to find two different tasks and present
them simultaneously, in order to compare performance with the two single tasks in which the
participants have already performed well. If the performance of the first task decreases when
it is presented concurrently with the second task, it can be inferred that the two tasks both
require the same cognitive resource [22,23] and that that common resource acts as a bottleneck
[20,24]. McKinnon and Moscovitch [25] showed that young adults performed significantly
worse on second-order ToM reasoning than on first-order ToM reasoning in a dual-task con-
dition with a demanding secondary executive function task (i.e., the 2-back task). Participants
in the single-task condition who only did second-order ToM reasoning did not show any loss
in performance. This result was replicated in another study with young adults using a more
advanced and naturalistic ToM task, namely the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” task [26].
The serial processing bottleneck hypothesis can be seen as a procedural explanation of the
cognitive process of serializing the hierarchical content of thought into proper chunks along
with their relations such that they fit easily through the processing bottleneck. Working mem-
ory constrains this process in terms of capacity and efficiency. The order of the processed
chunks also reflects the reasoning steps children have to go through in order to solve a second-
order false belief task. The serial processing bottleneck hypothesis is tantamount to a computa-
tional account under which second-order false belief can be conceived as a social-cognitive
reasoning task employing a proper procedure–serialization–and a critical amount of mental
resources–working memory–in order to cope with its nested structure.
Because working memory acts as a bottleneck, we propose that children who cannot pass
second-order false belief tasks might have a lack of efficiency in reasoning when they have to
serially process embedded beliefs. More specifically, when children try to answer second-order
false belief questions, e.g., “Where does Mary think that John will look for the chocolate?” but
have no efficient reasoning rule such as “if Mary didn’t see that John saw her hiding the choco-
late, then she thinks that John thinks that the chocolate is still where he put it before, which is
in the drawer”, more reasoning steps are needed to attribute a second-order false belief to
Mary. A possible sequence of reasoning steps from the child’s perspective might be as follows:
i) “John knows that the chocolate is in the toy box”, ii) “Mary does not know this”, iii) “Mary
knows that John put the chocolate into the drawer before”, iv) “Mary thinks that John will look
for the chocolate in the drawer”. In line with de Villiers et al. [27], each reasoning step is in the
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form of a single-embedded sentence at the surface. In addition to de Villiers et al.’s study, the
serial processing bottleneck hypothesis allows us to propose a possible explanation for their fail-
ures on children’s development of processing these rules to answer the second-order false
belief question in terms of working memory.
If children do not have an efficient reasoning rule, they need to go through each of the rea-
soning steps i-iv, which occupies working memory temporarily. In order to proceed in reason-
ing, due to the working memory bottleneck, at each step, the information in working memory
needs to be sent to long-term memory to be retrieved later, if necessary. Retrieving informa-
tion from long-term memory also takes time and increases the odds of forgetting and of
retrieving wrong information [28]. Therefore, having more inefficient rules instead of one effi-
cient rule means that the process is more prone to errors and takes more time [29,30]. This
view is consistent with research showing that children perform better in language comprehen-
sion tasks and cognitive tasks when they are given more time [31–34]. Once children have
enough experience in applying these reasoning steps sequentially, they are combined to one
efficient rule, repeated here for convenience: “if Mary didn’t see that John saw her hiding the
chocolate, then she thinks that John thinks that the chocolate is still where he put it before,
which is in the drawer” (see [35] for the details of a mechanism that combines rules).
In order to investigate the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis, we looked at the relation-
ships between a complex working memory task, a simple working memory span task, and sec-
ond-order false belief reasoning. We did not use a dual-task paradigm because children have
to be good at second-order false belief reasoning already in order to use a dual-task paradigm
and our main focus is on children who are still developing second-order false belief reasoning.
Although both simple and complex working memory tasks are related to working memory in
a broader sense, they require different strategies. Unlike our simple working memory task that
only requires building a representation of a list of words to be remembered, our complex
working memory task requires processing information serially as well as cognitive control
[36,37]. Therefore, we reason that children who have complex working memory strategies that
can overcome the working memory bottleneck will be more successful in applying these in sec-
ond-order false belief reasoning as well.
As a simple working memory span task, we used a word span task (WST) and as a complex
working memory span task, we used a listening span task (LST). Considering the language-
based nature of the listening span task, we used the word span task instead of the digit span
task in order to keep the modality the same between the simple and complex span tasks. How-
ever, our results still can be compared with Perner et al.’s and Hasselhorn et al.’s study, because
it has been shown that word span and digit span are closely related, r = .65, p< .001 [38] and
have been grouped together with other span tasks which test the same component of working
memory [39].
We follow Carlson’s [40] terminology, and refer to our simple word span task as a measure
of pure working memory. Note that simple word span tasks have been referred to as short-
term memory tasks as well [41]. The details of the tasks are explained in the Methods section.
Syntactic Recursion and Theory of Mind
Similar to the studies showing that language development contributes to the development of
first-order ToM [27,42–47] (but see [48] for evidence of false belief understanding in preverbal
infants), a number of studies have shown that language is important in children’s development
of second-order ToM.
For example, Hollebrandse, van Hout, and Hendriks [49] compared six- to nine-year-olds’
performance on a verbal and a low-verbal version of a second-order false belief task in order to
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investigate whether language in general helps children to pass second-order false belief tasks.
They found that children’s scores were lower in the low-verbal version of the second-order false
belief task compared to the verbal version and concluded that language might support explicit
reasoning about higher-order beliefs by facilitating tracking different beliefs. Similar to the find-
ings of Hollebrandse et al. [50], Kuijper [51] found that low-verbal second-order false belief
tasks are also harder than high-verbal ones for children between six and twelve years of age who
have been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder or attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.
Lockl and Schneider [52] found that, at the age of five, children’s general language abilities
(i.e., a combined score of sentence comprehension, morphological rule abilities and sentence
memory) were strongly correlated with their second-order false belief reasoning. However,
they stated that their data were not well suited to separate out the effects of syntactic and
semantic abilities (p. 163). These studies indicate that explicit mental state language may sup-
port the development of second-order false belief reasoning. Yet, it is still not clear which
aspect of language it is that helps.
Therefore, in this study, we investigate the possible relationship between syntactic recursion
in the language domain and recursion in the thought domain on the same level of recursion,
namely second-order.
The syntactic component of language is found to be related to first-order ToM in terms of
its hierarchical embedding structure [27,43,53–55]. Usually, first-order complement clauses,
as shown below in Example (1) (adapted from [44]), have been used in the literature to investi-
gate this relationship. Complement clauses such as “that p” may be used to express proposi-
tional attitudes (or opinions) towards some state p in the world [27]. They may be preceded by
mental state verbs as in “Mary knows that p” or in “Mary believes that p” or by communica-
tion verbs as in “Mary said that p”. Complement clauses can be used recursively, as shown
below in Example (2). Moreover, complement clauses allow people to represent states that
contrast with reality or with other people’s mental states in terms of truth-value. Thus, while in
Example (2), “Mary said that there was a flea in her cereal” might be false, the whole sentence
“John said that Mary said that there was a flea in her cereal” might be true.
1. First-order complement clause: “Mary said that there was a spider in her cereal. But it was
just a raisin”.
2. Second-order complement clause: “John said that Mary said that there was a flea in her
cereal. But in fact, she said that there was a spider in her cereal”.
Recently, de Villiers et al. [27] argued that experience with truth-value contrasts in contexts
with full tensed complement clauses such as Example (1) opens the door for children to pass
first-order ToM tasks and to recognize syntactic recursion. Subsequently, understanding sen-
tence recursion allows children to pass recursive ToM tasks. More specifically, they suggest
that recursive complements in contexts in which the truth-values vary, such as in Example (2),
are necessary for recursive false belief reasoning. However, they conclude that their predictions
need to be explored further.
Like complement clauses, relative clauses can be used recursively; that is, besides first-order
relative clauses, there are second-order relative clauses as well as even higher-order relative
clauses. At each level of recursion they may refer to a different subject or object. However,
unlike complement clauses, relative clauses do not involve propositional attitude verbs such as
“knowing that” or “believing that” or communication verbs such as “saying that” and they do
not involve truth-value contrasts. Table 1 shows examples of the progression of orders of
recursion for ToM attributions and relative clauses. Unlike de Villiers et al. [27], who focused
on complement clauses, we used relative clauses, which allows us to specifically focus on the
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structural parallelism between second-order recursion in the language domain and in the
thought domain by excluding the role of truth-value contrasts.
In the first-order domain, Hale and Tager-Flusberg [56] demonstrated that preschoolers
who were trained on first-order complement clauses improved their first-order ToM skills sig-
nificantly while those trained on first-order relative clauses did not. On the other hand, Smith,
Apperly, and White [57] found a positive correlation between first-order relative clauses and
first-order false belief tasks in children between the ages of 3 and 4. They concluded that first-
order false belief reasoning might not be related to the specific structure of the complement
clauses but to the broader category of embedded structures. Another developmental study
with Turkish first-order relative clauses supports this positive relationship of first-order rela-
tive clauses and first-order ToM [58].
Although the role of first-order relative clauses in first-order false belief reasoning has not
been resolved yet, it is worthwhile to investigate the relationship between second-order relative
clauses and second-order false belief reasoning. This is because relative clauses share only the
syntactic feature of embedded (meta-) representation with second-order false belief reasoning,
in contrast to complement clauses, which additionally share semantic features with false belief,
namely the fact that the main clause and the embedded complement clause have independent
truth-values [56,57,59]. Since we are mainly interested in the structural and representational
parallelism between recursion in the language and the thought domain, we chose a second-
order relative clause comprehension task (REL_2) as a linguistic predictor of a second-order
false belief task, which importantly concerns the same level of recursion. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that second-order relative clauses have been studied in relation
to second-order false belief reasoning.
Predictions
1. Based on the serial processing bottleneck, we predict that the relationship between the com-
plex working memory task and the second-order false belief task will be stronger than the
relationship between the simple working memory task and the second-order false belief task.
2. Because the second-order false belief task and the second-order relative clause task share
the same level of recursion, we expect a significant correlation between the two tasks.
Therefore, we expect both the complex working memory task and the second-order relative
clause task to figure importantly in the development of second-order false belief reasoning.
Method
Participants
Initially, a sample of 103 children between the ages three and eight was recruited from local
kindergartens and primary schools in predominantly middle- and upper middle-class areas of




Theory of mind Relative clauses
Zero-order The sheep is pushing a monkey. The sheep is pushing a monkey.
First-order You think that [the sheep is pushing a
monkey].
You show me [the sheep that is pushing a
monkey].
Second-order You think that [the monkey thinks that
[the sheep is pushing a monkey]].
You show me [the monkey that is pushing [a
sheep that is pushing a monkey]].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t001
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Ankara, Turkey. Our study has been approved by Middle East Technical University (METU)
Research Centre for Applied Ethics. A written parent approval form was obtained for every
child that participated in the study. All children were monolingual Turkish native speakers.
Three children left the study before it was completed. We excluded the youngest 11 children
(range: 3;8–4;5) because they had very low scores in all tasks, indicating that the tasks were too
hard for them in general. Thus, the results of 89 children were analyzed (37 female, Mage = 6;7
years, SE = 0.13, range: 4;5–8;10). Gender did not show any effect; therefore, the analyses were
collapsed over gender. Considering the previous literature which indicates that second-order
false belief reasoning starts to manifest itself between the ages five and seven [10,11] and that
Turkish children’s development of first-order and second-order false belief reasoning shows a
similar pattern with children in Western countries [58,60,61], we divided participants into the
following two age groups: children younger than 6;6 were assigned to a younger age group and
children older than 6;6 to an older age group:
1. Younger (4–6 years) n = 41; range = 4;6–6;5; Mage = 5;6; SE = 0.10; 17 female,
2. Older (6–8 years) n = 48; range = 6;7–8;10; Mage = 7;6; SE = 0.11; 20 female.
Design
A cross-sectional study design was used with age as a quasi-independent between-subjects var-
iable. The same person tested all of the children in a quiet empty classroom at their school. For
each child, all of the tests were completed in one session, which varied from 25 to 35 minutes.
All children participated in the following four tests in the following order: Word span task,
second-order false belief tasks, second-order relative clause task, and listening span task. We
wanted to keep some temporal distance between the two working memory tasks to prevent
any interference effects. For this reason, we used one working memory task at the beginning
and the other at the end of the session. Moreover, because we used children’s second-order
false belief task scores as dependent variables, we used this task as a second task in our study,
in order to prevent a possible fatigue effect. As Carlson and Moses [62] argued, using a fixed
order of tasks is standard practice in individual differences research and especially for inter-
preting correlations between tasks it is important that the task order remains the same for all
participants.
Note that we also tested children with a pragmatic understanding task that we constructed.
This task was presented after the second-order false belief tasks. In this task, children had to
choose correct morphological case markers on an object–definite or indefinite–depending on
whether the protagonists in a story had encountered the object before or not. However, this
task did not correlate with any other task that we used in the experiment. For this reason, we
do not present this task and its results here.
Materials and Procedure
In this section, we present the materials and the procedures in the following order: second-
order false belief task, second-order relative clause task, word span task, and listening span
task. All of the stimuli can be found in S1 Materials.
Second-order false belief task (FBT_2). This task consists of two different second-order
false belief stories, namely the “Birthday Puppy Story” and the “Chocolate Bar Story”. Both sto-
ries were adapted from English to Turkish from Flobbe and colleagues’ [63] study with the
authors’ permission. These stories were told to the subjects while presenting Flobbe and col-
leagues’ drawings. Second-order embedding structures such as “Ayla thinks that Murat thinks
The Development of Second-Order Theory of Mind
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that the chocolate is in the drawer” were not explicitly used in the stories. The order of stories
was balanced.
While hearing a story, children were first asked a reality control question (“Where is the
chocolate now?”), and a first-order ignorance question (“Does Murat know that Ayla has hid-
den the chocolate in the toy chest?”), as well as a linguistic control question (“Does Ayla know
that Murat saw her hide the chocolate?”). The experimenter repeated the essential parts of the
story and the control questions if a child gave a wrong answer for the control questions to
make sure that children did not have any problems with remembering the stories and with the
syntactic structure of double-embedded clauses. The upper limit for repeating the story and
the control questions was three times (see [6,64] as an example for repeating the control ques-
tions). All of the children gave correct answers to the control questions within that limit.
After the control questions, the children were asked (only once) a second-order false belief
question: “Where does Ayla think that Murat will look for the chocolate?” and then (only
once) a justification question: “Why does Ayla think that?”. In order to investigate the effects
of our syntactic recursion and working memory tasks at different stages of second-order ToM
development, we analyzed children’s judgments of the second-order false belief questions and
justifications for their judgments separately (see [65], for an example of reporting judgment
and justification answers separately). The rationale for analyzing both judgment and justifica-
tion answers derives from a computational study showing that the operational demands of
providing a justification are higher than the demands of making a judgment [66]. Therefore, it
might be possible that the syntactic recursion and working memory have different effects on
children’s judgments and justifications in second-order false belief tasks. A judgment score of
1 was given for a correct answer to a second-order false belief question, and a score of 0 was
given for a wrong answer and for the answer “I don’t know”. Because we used two different
stories, judgment scores could range from 0–2.
Children’s justifications for the second-order false belief task were coded based on the
methods described by Perner and Wimmer [10] and Sullivan et al. [11]. The categories were
divided into two groups: correct and incorrect. If a child’s justification answer included the
correct information that one character does or does not know about the other character’s his-
tory of exposure to relevant information, it was coded as correct. Otherwise, the justification
was coded as incorrect (0 points). Correct justifications were divided into the following five
mutually exclusive groups:
1. Explicit second-order reasoning: The child embeds one character’s epistemic state in the
other character’s mental state, for example, “Because she believes that Murat doesn’t know
that the chocolate is in the box” (“C¸u¨nku¨ Murat’ın c¸ikolatanın kutunun ic¸inde olduğunu
bilmediğini zannediyor”).
2. Implicit second-order reasoning: Relevant information is embedded in one character’s epi-
stemic state, for example, “Because she doesn’t know that Murat saw it” (“C¸u¨nku¨ Murat’ın
go¨rdu¨ğu¨nu¨ bilmiyor”). Similar to Sullivan et al.’s [11] study, we consider this statement to
be second-order because of the role it plays in justifying a correct response.
3. Perceptive information: Relevant information is embedded in one character’s perception,
for example, “Because she didn’t see that Murat was looking through the window” (“C¸u¨nku¨
Murat’ın pencereden baktığını go¨rmedi”).
4. Communicative information: Information is mentioned that was communicated to the sec-
ondary character, for example, “Because she said she bought a ball” (“C¸u¨nku¨ top aldığını
so¨ylediği ic¸in”).
The Development of Second-Order Theory of Mind
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5. Location information: The original location of the object is mentioned, for example,
“Because Murat put it into the drawer before” (“C¸u¨nku¨ Murat c¸ekmeceye koymuştu”).
As can be seen from the above-mentioned groups of justification answers, the sophistica-
tion of the answers differs. While the answers in the explicit and implicit second-order reason-
ing groups (a and b) include mental state words, the other three groups (c, d and e) do not
include any mental state word. For these reasons, we gave 2 points for the answers in the
explicit and implicit second-order reasoning categories and we gave 1 point for the answers in
the other categories (see [6] for an example of a similar scoring procedure as ours, distinguish-
ing different types of justifications based on the complexity of the answers). Because children
were tested with two stories, the score range for their justifications was 0–4 in total.
Note that originally, we constructed three different versions of each second-order false
belief story, in order to investigate the effect of three morphological evidential markers on the
understanding of children’s second-order false belief reasoning: Neutral (present tense),–DI
(past tense indicating direct perceptual evidence),–mIş (past tense indicating hearsay or infer-
ence). Only one of these versions was presented to each subject (see S1 Materials for details).
Evidential markers encode the source of information and may therefore allow speakers and
learners of evidential languages such as Turkish to take a positional perspective on a given
propositional content–similar to propositional attitudes in false belief tasks [67]. However,
because we did not find any significant difference between the three evidential conditions, we
collapsed the data over them.
Second-order relative clause task (REL_2). This task concerns the comprehension of rel-
ative clauses in Turkish and was adapted from O¨zge, Marinis, and Zeyrek’s [68] first-order rel-
ative clause task with the authors’ permission. The questions and the drawings were modified
to second-order relative clauses. Fig 1 demonstrates the drawings for one of the questions in
this task. First, introductory pictures were shown to the participants in order to familiarize
them with the animals in the actions by telling the name of the animals and the actions (e.g.,
“This is a pushing sheep, this is a looking monkey and this is a pushing monkey”). After that,
the pictures representing the questions were shown one by one. The first and second rows of
Fig 1. Picture used in the second-order relative clause task (REL_2). “In which picture is there a sheep
that is pushing a monkey that is pushing a sheep?” Adapted from O¨ zge et al. [68] under a CC BY license, with
permission from the authors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.g001
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the picture were pointed out in order to make clear that there were two separate lines of pic-
tures by saying: “This is the first picture and this is the second picture”. In the practice session,
the experimenter explained that the participants were required to point out the row with the
animals corresponding to their answer. If they could not answer correctly in the practice ses-
sion, the experimenter pointed out the correct animals and described their actions. However,
no feedback was provided during the experimental session. The sentences were repeated up to
4 times. The critical positions for finding the correct answers were equally distributed across
the drawings (3 times in the first row and 3 times in the second row) and between right (2
times), left (2 times), and central position (2 times). One practice item and 6 experimental
items were used. A child’s total score for experimental items was minimally 0 and maximally 6.
There are other types of relative clauses, e.g., “You show me the sheep that a monkey is
pushing that a sheep is pushing”. Because our aim is to examine the relationship between syn-
tactic recursion and second-order false belief reasoning and not children’s different abilities in
different types of relative clauses, we used relative clauses of the form “In which picture is
there a sheep that is pushing a monkey that is pushing a sheep?”, which are straightforward to
understand [68]. Children are exposed to recursion in relative clauses from an early age, for
example in well-known nursery rhymes such as “This is the house that Jack built”, also cited in
de Villiers and de Villiers [44]: “This is the maiden all forlorn, that milked the cow with the
crumpled horn, that tossed the dog that worried the cat, that chased the rat that ate the cheese,
that lay in the house that Jack built.”
Note that one might argue that children tend to interpret indirect recursion as conjunction
reading. Thus, they might interpret “In which picture is there a sheep that is pushing a monkey
that is pushing a sheep?” as “In which picture is there is a sheep that is pushing a monkey and
a sheep?”. However, as you can see in Fig 1 and in S1 Materials, none of the pictures allow for
such a conjunctive reading. Because all of our subjects pointed out three adjacent animals in
one of the pictures throughout the task, we can say that this argument is ruled out.
Word span task (WST). Children’s simple working memory span was tested using a
Turkish version of the word span task (WST) [69]. Monosyllabic Turkish words such as “sac¸”,
“tuz” and “yurt” (hair, salt and country) were selected, considering their frequency in daily
usage and ease of pronunciation. There were seven sets that corresponded to ascending levels
of difficulty. Each level k contained three subsets of k+1 words each. At the first level, there
were three subsets of two words each, and at the seventh (last) level, there were three subsets of
eight words each. An example of the first level is: i) ko¨şk–muz (manor—banana); ii) pil– u¨st
(battery-upper); iii) buz–do¨rt (ice–four), and an example of the seventh (last) level is: i) tam–
bak–uc¸ –go¨z–hal–boş –ek–yurt; ii) u¨c¸ –kas–al–mu¨lk–bir–tut–dil–kum; iii) bul–pek–on–fal–
var–el–ses–genc¸. The words from these levels were read to the participants, starting from the
first subset at the first level. After reading one subset (e.g., ko¨şk–muz), the participant repeated
the words in that order. If the participant could not correctly reproduce two out of three sub-
sets at level k+1, the task was terminated and the level k was the score of the participant. Thus,
in the analysis, a child’s word span range may vary between 0 and 7.
Listening span task (LST). Children’s complex working memory span was tested using a
Turkish version of the listening span task (LST) [69]. The task consisted of sets of sentences
read out to the participants one by one. There was a total of five collections, each of which con-
sisted of six sets of sentences. The first collection contained six sets of two sentences each, the
second collection contained six sets of three sentences each, and so forth, until the fifth collec-
tion, which contained six sets of six sentences each. An example of a 2-sentence set of LST is as
follows: i) Muzlar bisiklete biner (“Bananas ride bicycles”); ii) Elimiz beş parmaklıdır (“Our
hands have five fingers”). The participants were expected to first judge the truthfulness of each
sentence by saying “Yes” or “No”. Secondly, they had to recall the last word of all the sentences
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of a set told to them so far, in reverse order. After they gave an answer to the first sentence,
the next sentence was told to them. For example, for the 2-sentence set, if the first sentence
was “Muzlar bisiklete biner” (“Bananas ride bicycles”), the participants were required to say
“Hayır; biner” (“No; bicycles”). After that, if the second sentence was “Elimiz beş parmaklıdır”
(“Our hands have five fingers”), they were required to say “Evet; parmaklıdır, biner” (“Yes;
fingers, bicycles”). If the participant made at most one mistake in a sentence collection, the
subsequent sentence collection, which comprised one more sentence per set, was told to the
participant. The score of the participants equaled the number of sentence collections in which
they did not make more than one mistake. Thus, participants’ scores could range from 0–6.
Results
Our main goal was to investigate the role of language and working memory in the develop-
ment of second-order ToM. In more detail, for the role of working memory, we aimed to test
the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis by using both a complex and a simple working mem-
ory span task. Based on the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis, we predicted that the rela-
tionship between the complex working memory task and the second-order false belief task will
be more salient than the relationship between the simple working memory task and the sec-
ond-order false belief task. Because second-order relative clauses have the same level of recur-
sion, we hypothesized that a child’s score on the second-order relative clause task would be a
predictor of his or her second-order false belief scores.
The second-order false belief task (FBT_2) judgment scores (W = 0.77, p< .001) and the
justification scores (W = 0.782, p< .001) were non-normally distributed. Because the data vio-
lated the normality assumption of ANOVA, a cumulative odds ordinal logistic regression with
proportional odds was run [70]. The proportional odds and multicollinearity assumptions
were satisfied. We first report the results for the development of tasks individually. We then
report the bivariate and partial correlations among the tasks. Finally, we predict the FBT_2
judgment and FBT_2 justification scores by using ordinal logistic regression. Note that all the
effect sizes (B) in the ordinal logistic regression are in terms of log odds.
Testing the Differences between Younger (4–6) and Older (6–8) Age
Groups
Table 2 presents the means together with the standard deviations of all the variables for each
age group. Note that children between the ages 4;6 and 6;6 were assigned to the younger age
group and between the ages 6;7 and 8;10 were assigned to the older age group:
The analyses showed that while children in the older (6–8 years) group outperformed chil-
dren in the younger (4–6 years) group in the FBT_2 judgment scores (B = 1.29, SE = 0.42, p =
.002), there was no significant difference in the FBT_2 justification scores between the younger
and older age groups (B = 0.35, SE = 0.39, p = .38). Moreover, children in the older group
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the four tasks administered to each age group.
Younger (4–6 years) Older (6–8 years)
Tasks Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
False belief judgment (Range 0–2) 1.04 (0.82) 1.54 (0.58)
False belief justification (Range 0–4) 1.10 (1.30) 1.29 (1.27)
Relative clause task (REL_2) (Range 0–6) 1.15 (1.49) 1.92 (1.78)
Word span task (WST) (Range 0–8) 4.05 (0.80) 4.81 (0.87)
Listening span task (LST) (Range 0–6) 0.34 (0.69) 1.13 (0.98)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t002
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outperformed children in the younger group for the REL_2 task, (B = 0.88, SE = 0.39, p = .03),
for the WST task, (B = 1.69, SE = 0.45, p< .001), and for the LST task, (B = 1.87, SE = 0.47,
p< .001).
Table 3 shows the number of participants and percentages (in parentheses) for each sec-
ond-order false belief (FBT_2) judgment score (0–2) and justification score (0–4). Consistent
with the literature [17], judgment scores for the second-order false belief question were a bit
higher for the ‘Birthday Puppy’ story than for the ‘Chocolate Bar’ story for both the younger
age group (Mscore.chocolate bar = 0.46, SD = 0.50; Mscore.birthday puppy = 0.56, SD = 0.50) and the
older age group (Mscore.chocolate bar = 0.69, SD = 0.47; Mscore.birthday puppy = 0.85, SD = 0.36).
The detailed results about the frequency and percentage of each type of justification answer
are shown in Table 4. As can be seen from Table 4, children’s correct justification answers
mostly involved implicit second-order answers (e.g., “Because she doesn’t know that Murat saw
it”) for both age groups. Moreover, while there were two children in the older age group who
gave explicit second-order justification answers (e.g., “Because she believes that Murat doesn’t
know that the chocolate is in the box”), none of the children in the younger age group gave any
explicit second-order answers. However, children’s justification answers in the older age group
(6–8) are clearly not at the ceiling and probably continue to develop after the age of 8.
Bivariate and Partial Correlations
To inspect the interrelationships among the four tasks, we conducted bivariate and partial cor-
relations. Table 5 shows the bivariate correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rs) and Table 6
Table 3. Number of participants and percentage (in parentheses) of each second-order false belief (FBT_2) score.
FBT_2 judgment score FBT_2 justification score
Age Group 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 4
Younger (4–6) 13 (32%) 14 (34%) 14 (34%) 20 (49%) 5 (12%) 12 (29%) 0 (0%) 4 (10%)
Older (6–8) 2 (4%) 18 (38%) 28 (58%) 18 (37%) 10 (21%) 11 (23%) 6 (13%) 3 (6%)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t003
Table 4. Frequency (Freq.) and percentage (%) of each type of justification answers.
Story type Justification type Younger (4–6 years) Older (6–8 years)
Frequency % Frequency %
Chocolate Bar story
Explicit second-order 0 0 1 2
Implicit second-order 13 32 10 21
Perceptive information 1 2 9 19
Communicative information 0 0 0 0
Location information 2 5 6 12
Wrong answers 25 61 22 46
Total 41 100 48 100
Birthday Puppy story
Explicit second-order 0 0 1 2
Implicit second-order 7 17 10 21
Perceptive information 0 0 0 0
Communicative information 2 5 3 6
Location information 0 0 0 0
Wrong answers 32 78 34 71
Total 41 100 48 100
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t004
The Development of Second-Order Theory of Mind
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510 January 10, 2017 12 / 23
shows the partial correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rs) for the younger (4–6 years) and older
(6–8 years) groups. We used age (in months) as a control variable.
As can be seen from Table 5, for the younger group (4–6), there is a significant correlation
between the FBT_2 judgment score and REL_2 (rs = 0.33, p = .03), and a significant correlation
between the FBT_2 judgment score and LST (rs = .51, p =< .001). However, as shown in
Table 6, correlations between the FBT_2 judgment score and REL_2 become insignificant
when we control for LST (rs = —.001, p = .99) but remain significant when we control for age
Table 5. Bivariate correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rs) for the younger (4–6 years) and older (6–8 years) age groups.
Younger group (4–6 years) Older group (6–8 years)
1a 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
FBT_2 Judgment (range: 0–2) 1. Age (in months) - - - - - - - - - -
2. Judgment .27 - - - - .13 - - - -
3. Relative clause task (REL_2) .14 .33* - - - .001 .09 - - -
4. Word span task (WST) .15 .15 .32* - - .15 .13 .42** - -
5. Listening span task (LST) .10 .51*** .66*** -.05 - .15 .17 .41** .38** -
FBT_2 Justification (range: 0–4) 1. Age (in months) - - - - - - - - - -
2. Justification .14 - - - - .21 - - - -
3. Relative clause task (REL_2) .14 .48** — - - .001 .22 - - -
4. Word span task (WST) .15 .29 .32* - - .15 .15 .42** - -
5. Listening span task (LST) .10 .59*** .66*** -.05 - .21 .37** .41** .38** -
Note.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001.
aThe numbers in this row are used as abbreviations for the age and the tasks that were enumerated in the second column of this table.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t005
Table 6. Partial correlation coefficients (Spearman’s rs) for the younger (4–6 years) and older (6–8 years) groups.
Younger group (4–6 years) Older group (6–8 years)
1a 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
FBT_2 Judgment 1. Age (in months) - - - - - - - -
2. Relative clause task (REL_2) .31*b - .30* - .001 .09 - .03 .02
3. Word span task (WST) .12 .05 - .20 .12 .11 - .08
4. Listening span task (LST) .50*** .41** .52*** - .15 .14 .13 -
FBT_2 Justification 1. Age (in months) - - - - - - - -
2. Relative clause task (REL_2) .47*** - .43** .16 .22 - .08 -
3. Word span task (WST) .27 .16 - .39** .12 .06 - .004
4. Listening span task (LST) .58*** .41** .63*** - .34* .32* .35* -
Note.
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001.
aThe numbers in this row are used as abbreviations for the age and the tasks that were enumerated in the second column of this table.
b The partial correlations show the correlation between a variable in a row and judgment/justification score when a variable in a column is controlled for. For
example, (.31*) shows the partial correlation between REL_2 and judgment score when age (in months) is controlled for.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t006
The Development of Second-Order Theory of Mind
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510 January 10, 2017 13 / 23
(rs = .31, p = .04) and for WST (rs = .30, p = .04). On the contrary, the correlation between the
FBT_2 judgment score and LST remains significant when we control for age (rs = .50, p<
.001), REL_2 (rs = .41, p = .006) and WST (rs = .52, p< .001). For the older group (6–8), none
of the tasks show significant correlations with the FBT_2 judgment score. The lack of signifi-
cant relationships between LST and older children’s FBT_2 judgment scores (range 0–2) is
due to the fact that the older children already performed well in providing judgment answers,
so there is a lack of enough variation in the data.
Similar to the FBT_2 judgments scores, for the younger age group, there is a significant cor-
relation between the FBT_2 justification score and REL_2 (rs = .48, p = .001), and a significant
correlation between the FBT_2 justification score and LST (rs = .59, p< .001). Moreover, there
is a marginally significant correlation between the FBT_2 justification score and WST (rs = .29,
p = .07). As partial correlations reveal in Table 6, only the correlation between the FBT_2 justi-
fication score and LST remains significant when we control for age (rs = .58, p< .001), REL_2
(rs = .41, p = .006) and it even increases somewhat when we control for WST (rs = .63, p<
.001), previewing the results of the subsequent regression analyses.
For the FBT_2 justification scores in the older age group, there is only a significant correla-
tion between the FBT_2 justification score and LST (rs = 0.37, p = .009). As shown in Table 6,
the correlation between the FBT_2 judgment score and LST remains significant when we con-
trol for age (rs = .34, p = .01), REL_2 (rs = .32, p = .02) and WST (rs = .35, p< .01).
Moreover, for both FBT_2 judgment and justification scores, we found a significant high
correlation between LST and REL_2 (rs = .66, p< .001). These correlations are still significant
when we control for age and the other tasks that we used in this study, indicating that LST and
REL_2 share a considerable amount of variance.
Predicting the Second-Order False Belief Task Score (FBT_2)
The results of the regression models that best predict second-order false belief judgment and
justification scores for both the younger (4–6 years) and the older (6–8 years) age groups are
presented in Table 7. We proceeded as follows with our model construction for the younger
group: In model 1, we entered the control variable “age in months” in order to account for any
more fine-grained age differences within the younger age group, as well as the second-order
relative clause task (REL_2), and the complex working memory task (LST), because we had
found significant bivariate correlations between the FBT_2 judgment score and these two
tasks. Moreover, even though we did not find strong significant correlations between the sim-
ple working memory task (WST) and FBT_2 judgment and justification scores, we kept WST
in our models because we had a specific prediction that LST is more related to second-order
false belief reasoning than WST is, based on the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis. In
Model 1, the effects of age in months (B = 0.05, SE = 0.04, p = .22), REL_2 (B = -0.51, SE =
0.36, p = .16), and WST (B = 0.68, SE = 0.46, p = .14) were insignificant; only the effect of LST
Table 7. Predicting second-order false belief task judgment and justifications scores for both younger (4–6) and older (6–8) age groups.
Younger group (4–6 years) Older group (6–8 years)
Variable B SE t p B SE t p
FBT_2 Judgment Age (in months) 0.06 0.04 1.48 .138 0.03 0.03 0.82 .41
Word span task (WST) 0.39 0.40 0.97 0.33 0.08 0.36 0.21 .83
Listening span task (LST) 2.16 0.82 2.67 .008 0.27 0.32 0.83 .41
FBT_2 Justification Age (in months) -0.005 0.04 -0.10 .92 0.03 0.03 1.02 .31
Word span task (WST) 1.12 0.49 2.29 .02 -0.05 0.34 -0.16 .88
Listening span task (LST) 1.91 0.57 3.35 < .001 0.79 0.33 2.42 .02
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169510.t007
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was significant (B = 3.44, SE = 1.35, p = .01). As shown in Table 5 and Table 6, considering the
strong correlations between REL_2 and LST, and based on the result of Model 1 that REL_2 is
not significant, we constructed Model 2 by excluding REL_2 from Model 1. As can be seen
from Table 7, the effect of LST on the FBT_2 judgment score is significant (B = 2.22, SE = 0.82,
p = .007), and the effect of WST is insignificant (B = 0.39, SE = 0.40, p = .33). The model com-
parison of Model 1 (Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) = 82.60) and Model 2 (AIC = 82.77)
was less than 2. Because a simpler model is preferred over a more complex one, we presented
the results of Model 2 in Table 7.
We followed the same procedure as explained above for the prediction of the younger age
group’s FBT_2 justification scores. We entered the control variable “age in months”, REL_2,
LST, and WST into Model 3. In Model 3, the effects of age (B = - 0.006, SE = 0.04, p = .89), and
REL_2 (B = - 0.10, SE = 0.30, p = .75) were insignificant, and the effects of LST (B = 2.05, SE =
0.73, p = .005), and WST (B = 1.18, SE = 0.53, p = .03) were significant. Based on the results of
Model 3, we constructed Model 4 by excluding REL_2 from Model 3. As can be seen from
Table 7, the effects of LST (B = 1.91, SE = 0.57, p< .001) and WST (B = 1.12, SE = 0.49, p =
.02) on the FBT_2 justification score are significant. Because Model 4 (AIC = 90.04) is a sim-
pler model than Model 3 (AIC = 91.94), we presented the results of Model 4 in Table 7.
For the older group (6–8 years), we had found a significant correlation only between LST
and the FBT_2 justification score, and for them, none of the tasks were significantly correlated
with the FBT_2 judgment score due to the lack of variation. Although none of the tasks were
significantly correlated with the FBT_2 judgment score, because the younger group’s (4–6
years) final model to predict the judgment score includes LST and WST, we constructed
Model 5 to predict the older group’s FBT_2 judgment score by adding LST and WST. As
shown in Table 7, in line with the lack of significant correlations, both LST and WST’s effects
were insignificant in the model.
Similar to the previous procedures, in order to predict older children’s FBT_2 justification
scores, we constructed Model 6 by entering the control variable “age in months”, WST, and
LST. The effect of LST is significant when we control for age (B = 0.79, SE = 0.33, p = .02), and
the effect of WST is insignificant (B = -0.05, SE = 0.34, p = .88).
These results suggest that the main predictor of second-order false belief reasoning is not
syntactic recursion and word span task but complex working memory.
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to investigate the role of syntactic recursion and working
memory in the development of second-order false belief reasoning as well as to provide a pro-
cedural account for the role of working memory. In order to focus on the different stages of
children’s development of second-order false belief reasoning, we have run separate analyses
of children’s judgments for the second-order false belief question and justifications for their
judgments. Our results showed that the main and strongest predictor of the development of
the second-order false belief reasoning is the complex working memory span (LST).
Let us first discuss the results related to the simple and the complex working memory tasks.
Considering the literature that we discussed in the Introduction, our finding that there is no
significant correlation between our simple working memory task and the second-order false
belief judgement scores for both younger (4–6 years) and older (6–8 years) age groups is in
line with Hasselhorn et al.’s study [19] that found no significant correlation between the simple
working memory task and the second-order false belief task when the effects of verbal ability
tasks and age were controlled for. Furthermore, our findings are also consistent with the previ-
ous literature that shows that complex working memory tasks are better predictors of measures
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of general intelligence than simple working memory tasks [71,72]. However, as shown in
Table 7, in addition to the highly significant effect of the complex working memory task, the
simple working memory task explains significant variation in younger children’s (4–6) justifi-
cation answers. This significant correlation of the simple working memory task disappears for
older children and only the complex working memory task is able explain the variance in chil-
dren’s justification answers. As we predicted, we found a significant correlation between our
complex working memory task and the second-order false belief judgment and justification
scores, even when we controlled for the simple working memory task, the second-order rela-
tive clause task and age in months–in the younger age group. Moreover, for the older age
group, for the complex working memory task, we found that it only significantly predicts the
second-order false belief justification score, not the second-order judgment score. The reason
is that the judgment scores do not differ much among the older children, while their justifica-
tions still do. Thus, justifications seem to be a more sensitive variable for older children in the
sense that they provide a finer distinction in their second-order reasoning abilities. While
older children can give correct second-order false belief answers, their development still con-
tinues in terms of their justification abilities.
Now, let us discuss our results in terms of one of our main goals, namely, testing the serial
processing bottleneck hypothesis [21]. Why is the complex working memory task more impor-
tant than the simple working memory task in predicting children’s performance on second-
order false belief reasoning, in terms of both judgment and justification scores? The serial pro-
cessing bottleneck hypothesis predicts that the difficulty of passing a second-order false belief task
is not just related to holding the different beliefs in mind but also to serially processing them.
In order to test this prediction, we have used both a simple working memory task (WST) that
requires just holding the information in mind and a complex working memory task (LST) that
requires not only holding information in mind but also processing that information serially, as
well as additional reasoning demands that require complex working memory strategies. We
argue that these differences between the complex working memory and simple working memory
tasks could be the reason why the simple working memory task cannot explain enough variation
of children’s performance on second-order false belief reasoning. Two subtasks appear to be
required for successful second-order false belief reasoning: (1) keeping in mind the two separate
beliefs (e.g., of John and Mary) and (2) mapping their nested, recursive structure onto the appro-
priate sequential order: Mary’s belief that John believes that p, such that they can pass the serial
processing bottleneck smoothly. A few young children and many older children overcome the
serial processing bottleneck by means of their complex working memory strategies, which are nec-
essary for both the complex working memory task and the second-order false belief reasoning.
It is important to discuss some additional challenges of the Turkish version of the complex
working memory task that we used, namely the listening span task. First, Turkish is a verb-
final language–hence, the final word of the sentence, which is the critical word to be reported
in the listening span task, may be a verb. Verbs and nouns have different semantic and compu-
tational loads and may therefore not be memorized equally well in the listening span task. Sec-
ond, because in Turkish, the present form of the verb takes the suffixes–er,–ar,–ir, –u¨r,–ur
(depending on vowel harmony) for positive sentences while it takes the suffixes–maz,–mez for
negative sentences, an additional challenge of the task for children in our study was to repeat
the last word of the sentence when the sentence was false and they had to say “Hayır” (“No”).
So, participants had to inhibit the negative form of the final verb, e.g., for the sentence “Muzlar
bisiklete biner” (“Bananas ride bicycles”) they should not say “binmez” (“they don’t ride”) but
“biner” (“they ride”). This additional load in inhibition, due to the way the Turkish morpho-
logical system works, may cause the listening span task results to be somewhat different for
Turkish children than for English-speaking children. Moreover, similar to what is argued in
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Carlson, Moses, and Breton [16] and Moses, Carlson, and Sabbagh [73] for the relation
between first-order ToM and executive function, the additional inhibition demands in the
Turkish version of the listening span task might be one of the reasons for its predictive power
of the development of second-order ToM reasoning in our Turkish sample. Note that there
were only 9 children (out of 41) in the younger group who scored more than 0 in the listening
span task. However, for those 9 children, the listening span task score still significantly predicts
the second-order false belief score in the ordinal logistic regression models. Further cross-lin-
guistic studies are needed to unravel possible developmental differences in the listening span
task between children speaking typologically different languages.
Now we will focus on the results about the role of syntactic recursion in the development of
second-order ToM that we tested by constructing a second-order relative clause task (REL_2).
As mentioned before, there is no consensus on the relationship between first-order relative
clauses and first-order ToM [56–58]. In line with those studies that showed a positive relation-
ship between the two, in the younger age group, we found a significant relationship between
the second-order false belief judgment score and our syntactic recursion task, a relationship of
rs = .31 (p = .04) when age was controlled for. Moreover, we found a significant relationship
between the second-order false belief justification score and our syntactic recursion task, rs =
.47 (p< .001) when age was controlled for. This two-fold positive relationship supports the
view that a purely structural parallel between the linguistic realm and reasoning [43,54] does
hold for the development of second-order ToM. However, this relationship completely disap-
peared when we controlled for the complex working memory task. This loss is due to the very
strong correlation between the complex working memory task and the second-order relative
clause task (rs = .66, p< .001 for the younger group, and rs = .41, p = .004 for the older group).
This common variance of both tasks is again shared with the second-order false belief score.
These strong mutual correlations are consistent with the hypothesis that the serial processing
bottleneck seems to strongly affect all three tasks, at younger and older ages.
Our findings appear to be of interest to both language and memory researchers. The find-
ings indicate, overall, that complex working memory strategies play a larger role in second-
order ToM reasoning than syntactic recursion. However, given the strong overlap between the
second-order relative clause task and the complex working memory task in both age groups, as
shown in Table 5, it seems plausible that they both require similar complex working memory
strategies that also facilitate second-order false belief reasoning. This similarity may give a hint
at a possible convergence between the language and the memory explanations. As for the lan-
guage explanation, hierarchical, syntactic embedding may be just the right representational
tool to aid in the serialization process. The propositions are lexically selected by matrix verbs
(e.g., “say” or “think”) as in embedded complement clauses (e.g., “John said that Mary said
that there was a flea in her cereal. But in fact, she said that there was a spider in her cereal”), or
dependent on a head noun (e.g., “the sheep”) as in embedded relative clauses (e.g., “Show me
the sheep that is pushing a monkey that is pushing a sheep”). Furthermore, they are clearly
demarcated and introduced by functional heads (“think that”; “the sheep that”). Thus, they are
delivered in proper chunks ready for serializing them and passing smoothly through the serial
processing bottleneck where central processes of interpretation take place. It is this chunking
that may facilitate reasoning about the various beliefs (John’s and Mary’s, as pointed out
above) in correct order. Importantly, horizontal, serial order directly follows from vertical,
hierarchical structure: What is higher in the structural representation precedes in the linear
string. As Hollebrandse and Roeper [55] state: “Recursion in grammar involves a translation
between a hierarchical into a linear structure”.
The fact that the complex working memory task and not the second-order relative clause
task is a better predictor for the second-order false belief reasoning may be due to the
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additional reasoning component in both our complex working memory task and the second-
order false belief task, which is lacking in our second-order relative clause task. For example, to
be able to pass the second-order relative clause task, one should parse the question “In which
picture is there a sheep that is pushing a monkey that is pushing a sheep?” to obtain the meaning
and select the proper picture that is the correct answer. Because the question includes second-
order recursion, it also needs serial processing of information. However, it is possible to check
the intermediate steps of the embedded parts of the sentence visually while parsing the sentence
from the presented figure (Fig 1), which reduces the demands of working memory.
On the other hand, when answering the second-order false belief question “Where does
Mary think that John will look for the chocolate?”, one is not only parsing the sentence to get
the meaning, one also reasons about the question to come up with an answer. To be able to
give a correct answer, one has to reason about the contradictory knowledge of Mary and John
based on the reasoning rules, such as “Mary did not see John saw her hiding the chocolate, so
she thinks that John thinks that the chocolate is still where he put it before, which is in the
drawer, and therefore Mary thinks that John thinks that the chocolate in the drawer”. To
achieve this reasoning, one should have efficient working memory strategies to overcome the
serial processing bottleneck. Similarly, LST also requires an additional reasoning component
beyond just holding in mind the to-be-remembered items and parsing the sentence, which is
judging the truth value of the sentence. In addition, in our Turkish version of the LST, partici-
pants had to suppress the negative morphological marker of the verb when the truth value was
negative, as discussed above.
As mentioned before, de Villiers et al. [27] argued that the truth contrasts in contexts with
first-order complement clauses (“Mary said that there was a spider in her cereal. But it was just
a raisin”) open the door for children to pass first-order false belief tasks and to recognize syn-
tactic recursion. They further argue that, subsequently, understanding sentence recursion in
contexts with second-order complement clauses allows children to pass higher-order theory of
mind tasks (e.g., second-order false belief tasks). In addition to de Villiers et al.’s [27] argument
that the truth contrasts might be an important stepping-stone in children’s understanding of
sentence recursion which facilitates recursive false belief reasoning, we propose a general
explanation for the development of children’s second-order false belief reasoning.
We surmise that children start to pass first-order false belief tasks when they learn to over-
come the serial processing bottleneck by constructing more efficient reasoning rules to be able
to attribute a false belief to another agent (first-order ToM) than applying the most salient rea-
soning strategy, that is, zero-order reasoning. Similarly, children pass second-order false belief
tasks when they again learn to overcome the serial processing bottleneck, but this time by con-
structing efficient reasoning rules for second-order ToM reasoning. Our theory can be tested
by adapting the standard second-order false belief tasks so that it is possible to derive children’s
level of reasoning (i.e., zero-order, first-order, second-order) from their answers to the sec-
ond-order ToM questions (see [53] for an example of a ‘Bake Sale’ story, in which a child can
answer a second-order question with reference to three different objects, which correspond
one-to-one to the three levels of ToM reasoning). We expect that children around the ages of 5
and 6 who cannot pass second-order ToM tasks will give mostly first-order answers instead of
zero-order answers (reality bias). The serial processing bottleneck hypothesis also provides a
procedural explanation of de Villiers et al.’s [27] following argument about children’s failure in
second-order recursive structures (i.e., “Mary believes that John thinks that . . .”): “In both com-
plementation and false belief reasoning, children first treat 2-level embedding as 1-level of
structure. It is as if one piece of the hierarchy is flattened, or skipped over in parsing.” (p. 239).
We may generalize children’s failures at first-order and second-order false belief reasoning
by saying that children’s incorrect answers are typically one order below the target order of
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false belief reasoning. Consistent with Miller’s account in terms of complexity (2009, p. 751),
our parallel construal of first- and second-order ToM reasoning as well as the similarity in the
patterns of failure may indicate that there is a common process underlying the development of
first- and second-order ToM reasoning. If cognitive control over competing representations is
gained and the nested structure of these representations can be serialized appropriately, chil-
dren are capable of second-order ToM reasoning. Although we have discussed our results in
terms of the complexity account, our results do not exclude the possibility that children’s
recursive language abilities and complex working memory strategies may also contribute to a
possible conceptual change that beliefs can be recursive.
Also note that we presented the tasks in the following fixed order: 1) simple working mem-
ory task; 2) second-order false belief task; 3) second-order relative clause task; 4) complex
working memory task. Although there is no a priori reason that this particular presentation of
the tasks might have produced the particular effects (for a similar case, see [74]), future
research is needed to rule out any effect of the order of the tasks.
Conclusions and Future Directions
As we predicted in the Subsection “Predictions” of the Introduction, there is a significant
relation between the complex working memory task and the second-order false belief task
and this relation is stronger than the relation between the simple working memory task and
the second-order false belief task. Moreover, as we predicted, younger children’s (4–6) dou-
ble-embedded relative task score is significantly correlated with their second-order false
belief task score. However, our study shows that the main predictor of the development of
second-order theory of mind (ToM) is the complex working memory task for both chil-
dren’s judgment and justification answers for the second-order false belief question. Our
study also shows that syntactic recursion and complex working memory measures are inter-
related, suggesting common underlying capacities and processes. Based on these results, we
propose that children’s second-order ToM develops when they are able to apply efficient
reasoning rules to process embedded beliefs serially, thus overcoming the serial processing
bottleneck.
To further test the serial processing bottleneck hypothesis, future research is needed, possibly
with a training study in which the children are trained with a complex working memory span
task while a simple working memory task is used in a control group. In this way, the effect of
complex working memory strategies on second-order ToM reasoning can be observed. More-
over, to test whether children’s second-order false belief reasoning is supported more by sec-
ond-order complement tasks, as argued by de Villiers et al. [27], or by complex memory tasks,
one could also design a training study in which children on the brink of second-order ToM
are subjected to training regimes consisting of second-order ‘memory of complement’ tasks
(condition 1) or various complex working memory tasks (condition 2) and compare their
improvements on second-order false belief tasks. Furthermore, to test whether the relationship
between syntactic recursion and second-order false belief reasoning holds exclusively for
recursion on the clause level or for recursion of any constituent, possessive recursions (as in
“Mary’s friend’s dress”) might be used [75]. In addition to testing these hypotheses with behav-
ioral data, constructing computational cognitive models by using cognitive architectures is a
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